1 Or for a different offence arising out of the same facts. The principle is now set out in s 1 of the Double Jeopardy submission. 12 The trial judge held that there was insufficient evidence in law to support the contention that Sinclair's contact with the two women involved violence or that the sexual contact that took place was nonconsensual. 13 The Crown had, at the time, no right of appeal against that decision.
14 Once the Act came into force, the Crown lodged an application under section 4 requesting authority to re-prosecute Sinclair on the basis of new evidence implicating him in acts of violence, namely expert evidence interpreting DNA tests on items of clothing belonging to the deceased women. The tests were undertaken between 2011 and 2012 using techniques that were not available at the time of the original trial 15 and provided support for the contention that Sinclair was involved in using these items as ligatures. 16 The application was successful and the High Court granted authority for a fresh prosecution. A second trial took place in November 2014 and Sinclair was convicted.
17

B. THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 4 (1) The new evidence
Under section 4, the new evidence on which the application is based must be evidence that was not available, and "could not with the exercise of due diligence have been made available", 18 at the original trial. The case against the acquitted person must be "strengthened substantially" 19 and the court must be satisfied that it is "highly likely", given the new evidence and the evidence led at the original trial, that "a reasonable jury properly instructed would have convicted the person of the original offence". 20 The new evidence cannot be evidence which was inadmissible at the original trial but, because of changes to evidential rules, has subsequently become admissible. 21 In Sinclair, the application of these tests was relatively straightforward and they were all satisfied.
22
(2) The interests of justice An application for a fresh prosecution cannot be granted unless it would be in "the interests of justice".
23
Unlike the equivalent legislation in some jurisdictions, 24 the Act is silent on the factors that might be taken into account, but the court held that these would include: the fact of the acquittal, the effect any publicity attendant thereon might have on a subsequent trial, the importance of the rule against double jeopardy, the importance of finality, the stress which might be caused to an accused, to witnesses, to victims or their families, the seriousness of the crime(s), the nature and strengthening effect of the new evidence and the conduct of the Crown, both at the time of the original trial and since.
In England and Wales, where the equivalent legislation has been in force for longer, the courts have tended to take the approach that where the 'new evidence' test is met, there will be a prima facie case that a fresh prosecution is in the interests of justice and the question for the court is whether there are good reasons to refuse the application. 26 In Sinclair, the High Court took a similar approach. There was no attempt to explain why a fresh prosecution would be in the interests of justice other than a brief nod to the "utmost seriousness" 27 of the offence. Instead the discussion focused on one potential impediment to a fair re-trial:
prejudicial publicity.
The respondent had argued that the publicity surrounding the case was such that a fair trial could not take place. 28 The publicity following the original trial had been extensive, 29 but the court was not persuaded. It took the view that sufficient safeguards -the trial judge's directions, the prohibition of any further publicity and the possibility of the trial taking place in a different geographical location 30 -existed to guard against the risks posed. 31 While perhaps a little idealistic, in terms of the faith it places in the ability of the jury to disregard prior publicity, 32 this is an unsurprising outcome, given the Scottish courts' general attitude towards the plea in bar of trial based on prejudicial publicity, which appears never to have succeeded. 33 Sinclair has lodged an appeal against his subsequent conviction on the basis that his re-trial was unfair, 34 but it would be surprising if his conviction was quashed on this basis. Crim LR 247 at 257. 27 Para 133. 28 Para 95. 29 As the respondent noted, this "was a case which brought a law officer to Parliament to explain the Crown position, resulting in a public statement by the Lord Advocate, a change in the law, and this application" (para 95). 30 In the event, Sinclair's trial took place in Livingston, away from the locus of events in Edinburgh. 31 Para 132. Similar safeguards were used to justify a re-prosecution in Dobson [2011] EWCA Crim 1255, a case decided under the equivalent legislation in England and Wales. The defendant had previously been acquitted of the murder of Stephen Lawrence and it is difficult to imagine a case involving a higher degree of potentially prejudicial publicity. 32 See Chalmers and Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 1) paras 18.05-18.07 for discussion of the relevant research in this area. 33 See Chalmers and Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 1) para 18.03. 34 "World's End murderer to appeal against double murder conviction over lack of fairness", Scottish Legal News, 18
May 2015, http://www.scottishlegal.com/2015/05/18/worlds-end-murderer-to-appeal-against-double-murderconviction-over-lack-of-fairness/.
which the application was based. Any "available, competent evidence", 35 including evidence available at the original trial, but for whatever reason the Crown chose not to lead, can be used in the subsequent trial. This permission also extends to evidence that was inadmissible at the original trial but, because of subsequent changes to the rules on admissibility, is admissible at the time of the re-prosecution. 36 This last point is of particular interest given the Scottish Law Commission's controversial proposals to substantially widen the admissibility of bad character evidence in criminal trials. 37 If these proposals had been law at the time of Sinclair's re-trial, his long history of previous convictions for similar offences 38 could potentially have been led as evidence against him.
C. DISCUSSION
The re-prosecution of Angus Sinclair was described by Lord Matthews in his sentencing remarks as making "legal history". 39 It is worth noting that it was only possible at all because, contrary to the recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission, the Scottish legislation has retrospective effect. 40 Other jurisdictions, including Ireland, 41 New Zealand 42 and Queensland, 43 have declined to give retrospective effect to the exceptions, which perhaps accounts for the lack of any applications in these jurisdictions to date. 44 At the time of writing, two further applications for permission to re-prosecute have been made by the Crown. In both cases the original acquittal was of a murder charge where the trial took place prior to the coming into force of the Act. Permission to re-prosecute has been granted in one, 45 while the other awaits judgment. 46 In the Policy Memorandum accompanying the Double Jeopardy Bill, the Scottish Government stated that the exceptions were "expected to affect only a very small number of serious criminal cases" and would most likely be used "infrequently, perhaps once every 5 years". 47 With three applications in the four years since the Act came into force, 48 this estimate has been exceeded but the numbers are still very small. The double jeopardy principle exists for good reasons, but the narrowness of the exceptions in the Act, coupled with their limited use to date only in extremely serious cases, should leave all but the most hardened supporters of an absolute rule satisfied that the reforms have been a positive development.
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